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TURN-COAT DISCLOSURE: THE IMPORTANCE OF 
FOLLOWING PROCEDURE 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
KING’S COUNTY 
Turturro v. City of New York1 
(decided May 16, 2011) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Turturro v. City of New York,2 the Supreme Court of the 
State of New York held that the defendant‟s use of grand jury mi-
nutes from a prior related criminal proceeding, for the purpose of im-
peaching a witness in the subsequent civil proceeding, was prec-
luded.3  The decisions from the United States Supreme Court case, 
Brady v. Maryland,4 and the New York Court of Appeals case, 
People v. Rosario,5 are essential to analyzing the decision in Turturro 
and the potential impact such a decision will have, because they lay 
foundation for the issue of disclosure.  In addition, the court in Tur-
turro relied heavily on precedent, which suggested balancing the 
grand jury secrecy with the potential for serving a public purpose 
through disclosure.6  Such judicial discretion requires a standard pro-
 
1 925 N.Y.S.2d 808 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 810 (“This court holds that any attorney in a subsequent action who is in posses-
sion of grand jury minutes is obligated to promptly advise the trial court and must follow the 
proper procedure prior to any further disclosure, . . . retention of grand jury minutes among 
unsealed court records is inexplicable.”). 
4 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
5 173 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y. 1961). 
6 See, e.g., People v. Di Napoli, 265 N.E.2d 449, 451 (N.Y. 1970) (“In exercising this dis-
cretion, the court must balance the competing interests involved, the public interest in disclo-
sure against that in secrecy.”). 
1
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cedure for disclosure.7  Although Turturro presents a unique situa-
tion, considering the Government is both in possession of the grand 
jury minutes and acting as defendant, the rationale set forth in these 
influential cases is useful in determining the impact Turturro will 
have on the judicial system. 
II. CASE AT ISSUE 
The plaintiff in Turturro, was a child who “sustained exten-
sive and permanent injuries” after being struck by a motor vehicle.8  
The driver was indicted on two separate charges and the plaintiff sub-
sequently brought a civil action against the driver, the owner of the 
vehicle and the City of New York.9  In the civil proceeding, the Dis-
trict Attorney, who represented the City of New York as a defendant, 
attempted to impeach a witness by utilizing grand jury minutes in the 
District Attorney‟s office‟s possession from the prior criminal pro-
ceeding.10  The court dismissed the jury, allowed cross examination 
“to proceed under seal” and “required a motion to unseal the grand 
jury minutes.”11  However, the plaintiff objected, “assert[ing] that the 
minutes [were] not certified, not consecutively paginated and upon 
review seem[ed] to be incomplete.”12  The court had to determine 
whether the disclosure of grand jury minutes from a prior criminal 
proceeding in a subsequent civil proceeding required “a court order 
or judicial supervision.”13  The court found that: 
 
7 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Dist. Attorney of Suffolk Cnty., 449 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1006 
(App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1982) (requiring a written order requesting the release of grand jury mi-
nutes). 
8 Turturro, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 811 (“The underlying action stems from a vehicular accident 
wherein the defendant Pascarella struck the infant plaintiff, . . . while he was riding his bike.  
[The infant] sustained extensive and permanent injuries. . . . The claims against the City 
sound in the failure to institute proper road calming measures to allay speeding in a noto-
riously dangerous and problematic street.”). 
9 Id. at 811 n.4 (“The accident gave rise to two grand jury investigations of Pascarella 
[driver], which resulted in charges being brought, and ultimately a plea to a felony of-
fense.”). 
10 Id. at 811 (“It is apparent that the City is in possession of two separate grand jury mi-
nutes related to two separate indictments stemming from the underlying incident. . . . [The 
minutes were obtained] when the City attorneys copied the criminal court file from the crim-
inal record room . . . [and] via co-defendant . . . .”). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Turturro, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (“Are grand jury minutes released pursuant to CPL §§ 
2
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[R]egardless of any prior disclosure of grand jury mi-
nutes to the defendant in a previous criminal proceed-
ing, he or she is not at liberty to circumvent the safe-
guards set up by the required procedures of motion 
practice and judicial control of the minutes by unfet-
tered dissemination and subsequent utilization. . . . 
Any other outcome would be completely contrary to 
the public policy of grand jury secrecy and would vi-
tiate the rules and judicial control vested by the case 
law.14 
Ultimately, the suppression of the grand jury minutes amounted to 
such a blatant disregard of public policy and procedure that it posed 
too great a “harm to the plaintiff” under the “zone of interest test” 
and the grand jury minutes were precluded from the case at issue.15 
III. LANDMARK DECISIONS 
The Supreme Court in Brady held that “the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates 
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to pu-
nishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion.”16  In Brady, the defense counsel requested review of extrajudi-
 
240.44, 240.45 and People v. Rosario . . . considered public documents thereby permitting 
subsequent disclosure and use for impeachment purposes in a civil trial without a court order 
or judicial supervision?”).  See generally N.Y. CPL 240.44 (McKinney 2011) (stating, “Sub-
ject to a protective order, at a pre-trial hearing held in a criminal court at which a witness is 
called to testify, each party, at the conclusion of the direct examination of each of its wit-
nesses, shall, upon request of the other party, make available to that party to the extent not 
previously disclosed: 1. Any written or recorded statement, including any testimony before a 
grand jury, made by such witness other than the defendant which relates to the subject matter 
of the witness‟s testimony.”); N.Y. CPL 240.45 (McKinney 2011) (stating, “After the jury 
has been sworn and before the prosecutor‟s opening address, or in the case of a single judge 
trial after commencement and before submission of evidence, the prosecutor shall, subject to 
a protective order, make available to the defendant: (a) Any written or recorded statement, 
including any testimony before a grand jury . . . .”). 
14 Turturro, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 810. 
15 Id. at 814; see also Dairylea Coop., Inc. v. Walkley, 339 N.E.2d 865, 867 (N.Y. 1975) 
(establishing that under the “zone of interest test” a petitioner must show harm will ensue in 
order to object to disclosure). 
16 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when 
criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused 
is treated unfairly.”). 
3
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cial statements made by the co-defendant prior to the trial.17  At trial, 
the defendant took the stand and “admitted his participation in the 
crime, but he claimed that [his co-defendant] did the actual killing.”18  
After the defendant had been “tried, convicted, and sentenced”19 it 
was discovered that the statement in which the co-defendant admitted 
to the actual killing had been withheld.20  The Maryland Court of Ap-
peals held that such suppression deprived the defendant of due 
process and remanded the case on “the question of punishment.”21  
The Supreme Court affirmed this holding, stating the “suppression of 
this confession was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”22 
In Brady, the Supreme Court likened the withholding of evi-
dence to the prosecutor constructing a trial that would deny the de-
fendant of exculpatory evidence—a trial that would be unjust.23  The 
co-defendant‟s confession, in the prosecution‟s possession, was po-
tentially exculpatory because it was evidence of the co-defendant‟s 
guilt and corroborated the defendant‟s defense theory; therefore, the 
prosecutor should have disclosed such evidence.24  However, the con-
fession‟s exculpatory value and admissibility is determined by the 
 
17 Id. at 84 (“Prior to the trial petitioner‟s counsel had requested the prosecution to allow 
him to examine [the co-defendant‟s] extrajudicial statements.”). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. (“[I]n his summation to the jury, [defendant‟s] counsel conceded that [the defendant] 
was guilty of murder in the first degree, asking only that the jury return that verdict „without 
capital punishment.‟ ”). 
20 Id. (“[B]ut one [statement] dated July 9, 1958, in which [the co-defendant] admitted the 
actual homicide, was withheld by the prosecution and did not come to petitioner‟s notice un-
til after he had been tried, convicted, and sentenced, and after his conviction had been af-
firmed.”). 
21 Brady, 373 U.S. at 85, 88 (“If [the co-defendant‟s] withheld confession had been before 
the jury, nothing in it could have reduced the appellant[‟s] . . . offense below murder in the 
first degree.”). 
22 Id. at 86.  See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
23 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88 (“A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an ac-
cused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps 
shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant.  That casts the prosecutor in the role of an 
architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice, . . . .”). 
24 7 N.Y. PRAC., NEW YORK PRETRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5:7 
(“[W]here exculpatory evidence is in the prosecution‟s possession and it directly implicates a 
potential defense, the obligation to present it to the jury may well exist.”).  
4
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court.25  Supporting language giving deference to the Court‟s discre-
tion states, “it is the court, not the jury, that passes on the „admissibil-
ity of evidence‟ pertinent to „the issue of the innocence or guilt of the 
accused.‟ ”26  Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that any 
admission of the confession would likely prejudice the defendant,27 
the Supreme Court stated that “we cannot raise that trial strategy to 
the dignity of a constitutional right and say that the deprival of this 
defendant of that sporting chance through the use of a bifurcated trial 
denies him due process or violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”28  Therefore, the Supreme Court in Brady 
reinforced the role of the court in determining proper disclosure. 
In Rosario, the Court of Appeals of New York considered 
whether the judge erred in releasing only “those portions of the 
[prior] statement containing the variances.”29  The court‟s refusal to 
release the testimony in its entirety denied the defense the opportuni-
ty to inspect and determine which portions of the statement would be 
helpful in potentially impeaching or discrediting a witness.30  The 
Court of Appeals of New York held that: 
[A] right sense of justice entitles the defense to ex-
amine a witness‟ prior statement, whether or not it va-
ries from his testimony on the stand.  As long as the 
statement relates to the subject matter of the witness‟ 
testimony and contains nothing that must be kept con-
fidential, defense counsel should be allowed to deter-
mine for themselves the use to be made of it on cross-
examination.31 
 
25 Brady, 373 U.S. at 90 (“[A] unanimous Court of Appeals has said that nothing in the 
suppressed confession „could have reduced the appellant[‟s] . . . offense below murder in the 
first degree.‟  We read that statement as a ruling on the admissibility of the confession on the 
issue of innocence or guilt.”). 
26 Id. (quoting Giles v. State, 183 A.2d 359, 383 (Md. 1962)). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 90-91 (internal citation omitted). 
29 Rosario, 173 N.E.2d at 882 (“After . . . direct testimony, defense counsel requested that 
the witness‟ prior statements be turned over to them for possible use on cross-examination.  
Instead, the statements were submitted to the trial judge for his inspection. . . . [H]e an-
nounced that he found some „variances‟ between statement and testimony . . . .”). 
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The defense‟s ability to review the entire statement is crucial because 
statements which may not rise to the level of “variances” may still 
provide the defense with strategic insight.32  Accordingly, the defense 
is better qualified than the “impartial presiding judge.”33  Additional-
ly, the trial judge‟s discretion is not wholly compromised by disclo-
sure of the entire statement as the trial judge ultimately has control 
over “the extent of cross-examination.”34  To ensure such control, the 
court mandated that any statement released to the defense be “re-
late[d] to the subject matter of the witness‟ testimony, . . . used for 
impeachment . . . [and is] not require[d] . . . [to] be kept secret or con-
fidential.”35  Therefore, the court in Rosario found that the judge‟s 
failure to disclose statements requested by the defense was error.36 
In Brady and Rosario, the Supreme Court and the New York 
Court of Appeals had to determine whether the suppression of pre-
trial statements violated the defendant‟s constitutional right to due 
process.  Both Brady and Rosario pose similar conflicts between 
theory and application.37  However, in each of these landmark deci-
sions the court utilized a different approach.  For instance, in Brady, 
the United States Supreme Court emphasized the role of the court in 
deciding the “admissibility of evidence.”38  However, in Rosario, the 
New York Court of Appeals pointed out some judicial shortcom-
ings.39  Ultimately, each of these decisions influenced the outcome in 
Turturro. 
In Turturro, the court was required to establish the appropri-
ate balance between the disclosure procedure applied to the use of 
 
32 Id. (“[S]tatements seemingly in harmony with such testimony may contain matter which 
will prove helpful on cross-examination[,] . . . or otherwise supply the defendant with know-
ledge essential to the neutralization of the damaging testimony . . . which will place the wit-
ness‟ answers upon direct examination in an entirely different light.”). 
33 Id. (“[O]missions, contrasts and even contradictions, vital perhaps, for discrediting a 
witness, are certainly not as apparent to the impartial presiding judge as to single-minded 
counsel for the accused; the latter is in a far better position to appraise the value of a witness‟ 
pretrial statements for impeachment purposes.”). 
34 Rosario, 173 N.E.2d at 883. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 884 (stating however, that the appellant was not prejudiced by the judge‟s error 
due to overwhelming guilt). 
37 See generally Brady, 373 U.S. at 83, 90; Rosario, 173 N.E.2d at 881, 884 (finding that 
disclosure was immaterial due to the preponderance of the defendant‟s guilt). 
38 Brady, 373 U.S. at 90. 
39 Rosario, 173 N.E.2d at 883. 
6
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grand jury minutes and judicial discretion.40  The potential for the 
grand jury testimony to affect trial raises a crucial issue in Turturro 
that was not present in Brady.  Although typically kept secret, the 
grand jury testimony at issue in Turturro had the potential to impeach 
a witness.41  If this testimony was let in it would alter the case whe-
reas in Brady, the introduction of the confession was irrelevant.42  
Additionally, the determination of whether to admit grand jury testi-
mony requires judicial discretion.  Unlike Rosario, which emphasized 
the necessity of advocacy, a determination of whether to admit grand 
jury testimony requires an unbiased point of view.  The admission of 
grand jury testimony, which has a strong policy for secrecy, is not a 
matter of advocating for the interest of the client, but for protecting a 
well established facet of trial procedure. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY & APPLICATION 
The decisions in Brady and Rosario established the deference 
of the court‟s discretionary power and the rights of a defendant re-
garding disclosure of pre-trial statements.  However, in Turturro, the 
court had to specifically address the disregard for judicial discretion 
and the disclosure of grand jury minutes by the defense.43  Grand jury 
minutes are distinguished from other forms of pre-trial statements, as 
discussed in Brady and Rosario, due to the long standing public poli-
cy of grand jury minutes secrecy as opposed to disclosure.44  In Unit-
ed States v. Procter & Gamble Company,45 the Supreme Court held 
that a “particularized need” for the disclosure of grand jury minutes is 
necessary, otherwise, the secrecy of grand jury minutes must be 
maintained.46  Similar to Turturro, in Procter & Gamble Co., there 
 
40 See generally Turturro, 925 N.Y.S. 2d at 810 (discussing whether grand jury minutes 
are public documents that should be disclosed for impeachment purposes). 
41 Id. at 810-11. 
42 Brady, 373 U.S. at 88. 
43 See generally Turturro, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11 (In this case, the government is the de-
fendant; whereas, the government is typically acting as prosecutor.). 
44 See generally N.Y. CPL 190.25(4)(a) (McKinney 2011) (stating, “Grand jury proceed-
ings are secret, and no grand juror, . . . may, except in the lawful discharge of his duties or 
upon written order of the court, disclose the nature or substance of any grand jury testimony, 
evidence, or any decision, result or other matter attending a grand jury proceeding.”). 
45 356 U.S. 677 (1958). 
46 Id. at 683. 
7
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was a criminal grand jury proceeding, which produced a transcript 
the Government attempted to use in the subsequent civil trial.47  The 
trial court granted the defendant‟s motion to utilize the same privi-
lege, stating that the transcript‟s usefulness “outweighed the reasons 
behind the policy for maintaining secrecy of the grand jury proceed-
ings.”48  On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this decision.49  The 
Supreme Court referred to the “long-established policy that maintains 
the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal courts.”50  
Such policy arguments include the need to “encourage all witnesses 
to step forward and testify freely,” and the role grand jury proceed-
ings play “as a public institution [meant to serve] the community.”51  
As such, the Supreme Court found that grand jury secrecy “must not 
be broken except where there is a compelling necessity.”52  Although 
there are exceptions that will warrant disclosure of grand jury mi-
nutes, even if a particularized need is properly demonstrated, the Su-
preme Court required that “the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted 
discretely and limitedly.”53 
New York has recognized the tension between the public pol-
icy for grand jury secrecy and the reality that at times exceptional sit-
uations will warrant disclosure.  For instance, in People v. Di Napo-
li,54 the Court of Appeals found that the lower court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing disclosure of grand jury minutes after it “bal-
 
47 Id. at 678 (“The Government is using the grand jury transcript to prepare the civil case 
for trial; and appellees, who are defendants in that suit, desire the same privilege.”). 
48 Id. at 679. 
49 Id. at 683 (“We only hold that no compelling necessity has been shown for the whole-
sale discovery and production of a grand jury transcript under Rule 34.  We hold that a much 
more particularized, more discrete showing of need is necessary to establish „good cause.‟  
The court made no such particularized finding . . . .”). 
50 Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. at 683; see also United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 
503, 513 (1943) (stating, “To allow the intrusion, implied by the lower court‟s attitude, into 
the indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings—as important for the protection of the 
innocent as for the pursuit of the guilty—would subvert the functions of federal grand juries 
by all sorts of devices which some states have seen fit to permit in their local procedure, such 
as ready resort to inspection of grand jury minutes.”). 
51 Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S at 682. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 683 (limiting the use of grand jury transcripts to impeachment and testing a wit-
ness‟s credibility). 
54 265 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1970). 
8
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ance[d] the competing interests.”55  The court in Di Napoli referred to 
five factors that should be considered in the course of determining 
whether or not grand jury minutes should be disclosed: 
(1) prevention of flight by a defendant who is about to 
be indicted; (2) protection of the grand jurors from in-
terference from those under investigation; (3) preven-
tion of subornation of perjury and tampering with 
prospective witnesses . . . (4) protection of an innocent 
accused from unfounded accusations . . . and (5) as-
surance to prospective witnesses that their testimony 
will be kept secret so that they will be willing to testi-
fy freely.56 
Although the court in Di Napoli established that the “secrecy of 
grand jury minutes is not absolute” and may be disclosed with a 
“written order of the court,” precedent suggests that the “determina-
tion of the question whether disclosure should be permitted is ad-
dressed to, and rests in, the trial judge‟s discretion.”57  New York 
courts have also extended the application of the balancing test set 
forth in Di Napoli to further reconcile additional difficulties regard-
ing whether or not disclosure may be expanded to civil and private 
proceedings.58  Ultimately, by implementing a balancing test, the 
court in Di Napoli placed the power of discretion within the court 
system and reconciled the tension between the public policy of secre-
cy and the inevitable exceptions for disclosure speculated in Procter 
 
55 Id. at 451 (“In exercising this discretion, the court must balance the competing interests 
involved, the public interest in disclosure against that in secrecy.”). 
56 Id. at 452. 
57 Id. at 451; see also In the Matter of Carey, 416 N.Y.S.2d 904, 908 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 
1979) (“[T]he statutes express the legislative intention that the secrecy of Grand Jury mi-
nutes be carefully guarded and that any decision for disclosure be made by a court, not by 
the District Attorney, by a Special Deputy Attorney General superseding him, or even by the 
Governor.”); Application of the City of Buffalo, 394 N.Y.S.2d 919, 921 (App. Div. 4th 
Dep‟t 1977) (“[T]he determination of a motion for disclosure of Grand Jury minutes rests in 
the sound discretion of the court.”). 
58 See, e.g., Buffalo, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (“Disclosure of Grand Jury minutes is not li-
mited to public bodies concerned with the administration of the criminal law . . . . [C]ourts 
have recognized a limited right in civil litigants to use a trial witness‟ Grand Jury testimony 
to impeach, to refresh recollection or to lead a hostile witness.”); Matter of Attorney-General 
of United States, 291 N.Y.S. 5, 6, 10 (Cnty. Ct. 1936) (utilizing its discretionary power to 




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
882 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
 
& Gamble Co.59 
It is apparent that both federal and New York State courts 
have emphasized the importance of judicial discretion regarding the 
public policy of grand jury secrecy and disclosure.60  In Turturro, the 
court dealt with the disclosure of grand jury minutes derived from a 
criminal proceeding and later utilized by the District Attorney, for the 
defense,61 in a subsequent civil proceeding.62  This case was unique in 
the sense that the court was denied the opportunity to utilize the dis-
cretionary powers set forth in landmark decisions such as Brady be-
cause the grand jury minutes were withheld.63  Likewise, the Gov-
ernment‟s full control over the grand jury minutes, completely 
disregarded the limited use permitted by a “particularized need,” for-
saking the long standing precedent of the public policy of grand jury 
secrecy.64  Logically, the suppression of the grand jury minutes made 
the application of the balancing test set forth by Di Napoli unavaila-
ble to the court in Turturro.65 
In further contrast to precedent, the District Attorney in Tur-
turro was in possession of grand jury minutes and represented the 
City of New York as defendant to the proceeding, completely misap-
propriating the rights of the defendant as set forth by Rosario to the 
rights of the plaintiff.66  Furthermore, circumvention of the necessary 
limitations regarding grand jury secrecy is not rationalized by the fact 
that the instant case was a civil proceeding since the policy of grand 
 
59 See Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. at 682 (“There are instances when that need [a 
compelling necessity] will outweigh the countervailing policy [of secrecy].”). 
60 Rosario, 173 N.E.2d at 883 (stating that in spite of the defense‟s unique point of view 
regarding the usefulness of statements for cross-examination, the trial court judge would ul-
timately maintain control over the extent to which such disclosure would be utilized in cross-
examination). 
61 Turturro, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11. 
62 Id. at 811. 
63 Id. at 814 (“[T]he failure to provide the Court with the records or to make the appropri-
ate application prevented the Court from reviewing the records for completeness, integrity 
and relevance.”). 
64 Id. at 811-12 (“Allowing the use of the minutes for those limited purposes should in no 
way open the door to complete access and use of the grand jury proceedings, as apparently 
has occurred in this matter.”).  See generally Fred A. Bernstein, Note, Behind the Gray 
Door: Williams, Secrecy, and the Federal Grand Jury, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563 (1994) (dis-
cussing the dichotomy between increasingly public trials and the traditional secrecy of grand 
jury testimony). 
65 Id. at 814. 
66 Id. at 813. 
10
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jury secrecy applies to both criminal and civil proceedings.67  Moreo-
ver, Turturro requires application of both criminal and civil ap-
proaches to disclosure.  Therefore, the District Attorney‟s complete 
disregard for submitting the grand jury minutes within the District 
Attorney office‟s possession to the court is blatantly inconsistent with 
the procedure set forth by influential cases in both federal and New 
York State courts. 
V. APPLICATION OF GRAND JURY DISCLOSURE IN CIVIL 
TRIALS 
A. Disparity Within Departments 
Although grand jury secrecy issues typically arise in criminal 
proceedings, courts have recognized that civil litigants are not wholly 
precluded from the disclosure of grand jury testimony.68  For in-
stance, the Court of Appeals in Di Napoli rejected the contention that 
disclosure of grand jury minutes was exclusively enjoyed by “offi-
cials or agencies concerned with the administration or enforcement of 
the criminal law.”69  However, disclosure of grand jury testimony in 
civil cases is not absolute and decisions from the Second and Fourth 
Departments illustrate the disparate outcomes regarding this issue. 
i. Second Department 
The Appellate Division, Second Department, in In re Quinn,70 
allowed the appellants (an unofficial group of town residents) to util-
ize grand jury testimony.71  In determining this, the court relied on 
the trial judge‟s discretionary power to make a determination based 
on the circumstances of the case.72  Approximately thirty years later, 
 
67 Buffalo, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 921. 
68 See In re Quinn, 47 N.Y.S.2d 66, 67 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1944) (reversing a denial of a 
motion to inspect grand jury testimony based on the court‟s discretionary power); Albert v. 
Zahner‟s Sales Co., 378 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1976) (stating that disclo-
sure is permitted in civil cases when it aids public interest). 
69 Di Napoli, 265 N.E.2d at 452. 
70 47 N.Y.S.2d 66 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1944). 
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the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Albert v. Zahner’s 
Sales Co.,73 further acknowledged the trend to permit disclosure of 
grand jury testimony where disclosure would serve a public interest.74  
However, the court in Albert refused to extend this right to “aid pri-
vate civil litigants” since disclosure had the potential to negatively af-
fect the public policy of grand jury secrecy.75  This inconsistency 
within the same department raises the issues of when, and to what ex-
tent, disclosure of grand jury testimony is permitted in civil proceed-
ings. 
ii. Fourth Department 
In Application of Scotti,76 the Appellate Division, Fourth De-
partment, granted disclosure of grand jury testimony.77  In Scotti, the 
proponent, the Special Deputy Attorney-General, sought the “release 
of specified Grand Jury minutes of testimony relating respectively to 
the conduct of certain officers . . . and certain employees . . . for con-
sideration of disciplinary action.”78  The court granted this applica-
tion for a particular purpose.79  In affirming such disclosure, the court 
acknowledged its discretionary power to determine the release of 
grand jury testimony.80  Next, the court relied on the District Attor-
ney‟s (and in some instances the Attorney-General or Special Depu-
ty) position as a facilitator of public interest.81  Due to the propo-
 
73 378 N.Y.S.2d 414 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1976). 
74 Id. at 415. 
75 Id. (“In our view, disclosure is not warranted to aid private civil litigants because of the 
chilling effect such disclosure might have on the ability of future grand juries to obtain wit-
nesses.”). 
76 385 N.Y.S.2d 659 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 1976). 
77 Id. at 664. 
78 Id. at 661. 
79 Id. (“On May 5, 1976 Mr. Justice Ball granted an order on each such application, each 
order containing the limitation that the minutes released thereunder shall be used „solely for 
the purposes of departmental disciplinary action and for no other purpose.‟ ”). 
80 Id. at 662 (“By statute the court has jurisdiction over grand jury minutes and has discre-
tionary power to release them.”); see also Di Napoli, 265 N.E.2d at 451 (“Firmly settled is 
the rule that determination of the question whether disclosure should be permitted is ad-
dressed to, and rests in, the trial judge‟s discretion.”). 
81 Scotti, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 662 (“Historically, the District Attorney (or the Attorney-
General or his Special Deputy acting under appropriate authority) has represented the public 
interest.”). 
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nent‟s position, it was within his power to request disclosure of grand 
jury minutes to facilitate disciplinary action for the public‟s interest.82  
To determine whether or not disclosure served a public interest, the 
court had to determine “whether the transmittal is in a public interest 
which transcends the policy of maintaining utmost secrecy in grand 
jury proceedings.”83  Accordingly, the court found that the testimony 
contained information necessary for the proponent to utilize in discip-
linary investigations - a legitimate public purpose.84 
In Application of the City of Buffalo,85 the Appellate Division, 
Fourth Department, found that “the denial of inspection of the Grand 
Jury minutes was proper.”86  The court in Buffalo declined to raise the 
purpose of “recouping an undetermined amount of money” to the 
same level of public interest as set forth by precedent.87  Ultimately, 
disclosure was denied.88  Therefore, similar to the Second Depart-
ment, courts in the Fourth Department have reached decisions both 
favoring and barring disclosure of grand jury testimony in civil pro-
ceedings.  Within both departments it appears that disclosure is a 
matter of degree—balancing public interest with public policy of 
grand jury secrecy.89 
B. The Use of Grand Jury Testimony in Civil 
Proceedings 
Although courts have recognized that disclosure of grand jury 
testimony is available to civil litigants, there are still limitations to its 
 
82 Id. (“When in his judgment there is evidence which bears upon the propriety of the 
conduct of a public employee, . . . it is only right and proper for him to act in the public in-
terest and to ask the court to consider his request that the information be transmitted to the 
agency.”). 
83 Id. at 663. 
84 Id. at 663-64 (“[T]he Grand Jury minutes . . . relat[ing] to the propriety of the conduct 
of the named officers and employees . . . is appropriate for the agency . . . to consider . . . in 
disciplinary investigations . . . [and the] special Term did not abuse its discretion . . . .”). 
85 394 N.Y.S.2d 919 (App. Div. 4d Dep‟t 1977). 
86 Id. at 922. 
87 Id. (“Still, the public interest in recouping an undetermined amount of money seems far 
less compelling than the public interest at stake in Di Napoli, . . . where avoidance of future 
episodes of public contract bid rigging and potentially huge savings to utility rate payers 
were in the offing . . . .”). 
88 Id. at 923. 
89 See Scotti, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 663. 
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application.  For instance, in Foley v. City of New York,90 the court 
found that disclosure of grand jury minutes for the purpose of im-
peachment was admissible.91  Two years later in Herring v. City of 
Syracuse,92 the court furthered the application set forth in Foley, and 
found that grand jury testimony may be used in a civil proceeding 
“not only for impeachment, but also to refresh recollection or lead a 
hostile witness.”93  Therefore, the disclosure of grand jury minutes in 
a civil case is not absolute. 
C. Turturro 
In Turturro, the City of New York sought to utilize grand jury 
testimony for the purpose of impeaching one of the plaintiff‟s wit-
nesses.94  Although the cause of action in Turturro was civil in na-
ture, with the government acting as defendant rather than prosecu-
tion, the precedent set forth by Di Napoli did not preclude the 
government from seeking disclosure of grand jury testimony.95  In de-
termining whether or not to admit disclosure, the trial judge may util-
ize his discretion based on the circumstances of the case to determine 
whether disclosure would serve a public purpose.96  In Turturro, the 
City of New York sought disclosure for the purpose of defending the 
City from alleged “failure to institute proper road calming measures 
to allay speeding in a notoriously dangerous and problematic 
street.”97  Unlike Scotti, where the disclosure would facilitate in the 
disciplinary investigations, the disclosure in Turturro would aid in 
exculpating the City from liability in a suit that rendered a child per-
manently injured.  Although this particular action was private, it is 
arguable that a finding of liability would provide a remedy to those 
harmed by the City‟s negligence—thus serving a public purpose.  
Disclosure of grand jury, which would potentially exonerate the gov-
ernment from liability, would potentially bar recovery in the instant 
 
90 348 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1973). 
91 Id. at 814. 
92 367 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Cnty. Ct. 1975). 
93 Id. at 700. 
94 Turturro, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11. 
95 See Di Napoli, 265 N.E.2d at 452. 
96 See Quinn, 47 N.Y.S. at 67 (stating that the lower court properly utilized its discretion). 
97 Turturro, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 811. 
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suit and may set a trend for others harmed by the City‟s negligence in 
the future.  Therefore, it is unlikely that the trial judge would find the 
circumstances of Turturro amounted to a public purpose that out-
weighed the public policy of grand jury secrecy.  However, if disclo-
sure was granted, the City‟s intent to utilize grand jury testimony for 
impeachment of a witness would have been sound, as established by 
the decisions in Foley and Herring.98 
VI. BURDEN & PROCEDURE 
As evidenced by the debilitating effect the District Attorney‟s 
actions caused in Turturro, the implementation of specific burdens 
and procedures to ensure proper disclosure becomes essential.  The 
Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,99 es-
tablished that the burden lies with the defendant to demonstrate “a 
particularized need” for disclosure.100  In Pittsburgh, the Supreme 
Court found no error in the trial judge‟s denial of disclosure of grand 
jury minutes since “the petitioners failed to show any need whatever 
for the testimony . . . . They contended only that they had a „right‟ to 
the transcript because it dealt with subject matter generally covered at 
the trial.”101  However, a “right” to grand jury transcripts does not 
make the procedures for disclosure unnecessary.102  For instance, in 
In the Matter of the District Attorney of Suffolk County,103 the court 
emphasized that the judge has discretion to require disclosure.104  Ac-
cordingly, the burden is on the “party seeking disclosure to rebut a 
presumption [of secrecy]” to fulfill certain procedural guidelines 
prior to the court‟s determination regarding disclosure of the grand 
jury minutes.105 
 
98 See Foley, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 814; Herring, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 700 (allowing grand jury 
testimony for the purpose of impeachment). 
99 360 U.S. 395 (1959). 
100 Id. at 400 (“The burden, however, is on the defense to show that „a particularized need‟ 
exists for the minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy.”). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 401. 
103 449 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1982). 
104 Id. at 1006. 
105 Id. at 1007 (“[A] party seeking disclosure . . . must, by a factual presentation, demon-
strate why, and to what extent, he requires the minutes of a particular Grand Jury to advance 
the actions or measures taken, or proposed . . . to insure that the public interest has been, or 
15
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In Pittsburgh, instead of arguing merely that the petitioner 
had a “right” to the grand jury testimony, the petitioner should have 
argued that the testimony of the witness from the grand jury was 
needed for cross examination for impeachment, recollection or credi-
bility.106  Further, the petitioner may have argued that withholding 
testimony that may potentially be exculpatory was a violation of his 
constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.107  The application of these standards of “particularized need” 
would have likely demonstrated a need that outweighed the public 
policy of secrecy.108 
However, even if a “particularized need” is properly demon-
strated, the opposing party may object.  In New York, courts have 
addressed the issue of determining who has standing to object to dis-
closure of grand jury minutes in cases such as Dairylea Coop. Inc. v. 
Walkley,109 which implemented the “zone of interest” test in an effort 
to expand who has standing to object to disclosure:110 
The „zone of interest‟ test was formulated to ascertain 
the petitioner‟s status without necessarily dealing with 
the merits of the litigation.  A petitioner need only 
show that the administrative action will in fact have a 
harmful effect on the petitioner and that the interest 
asserted is arguably within the zone of interest to be 
protected by the statute.111 
This approach focused more on the party bringing suit and less on the 
 
will be, served.”); see also Martinez v. CPC Int‟l, Inc., 450 N.Y.S.2d 528, 529 (App. Div. 2d 
Dep‟t 1982) (requiring that Grand Jury minutes are provided to the court “immediately prior 
to trial”). 
106 Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. at 683 (listing impeachment, recollection or credibili-
ty as acceptable instances of “particularized need” which may warrant the discrete and li-
mited disclosure of otherwise secret grand jury minutes). 
107 See generally Brady, 373 U.S. 83; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
108 See Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. at 679. 
109 339 N.E.2d 865 (N.Y. 1975). 
110 Id. at 867 (“Under traditional theory a party had standing only where he established 
that his legal rights had been invaded.  This approach, known as the „legal interest‟ test has 
recently been disavowed because it focuses on the issues to be litigated rather than on the 
party bringing suit.” (internal citation omitted)). 
111 Id. 
16
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issues being litigated.112  This is essential considering “[t]he increas-
ing pervasiveness of administrative influence on daily life on both the 
State and Federal level necessitates a concomitant broadening of the 
category of persons entitled to a judicial determination as to the va-
lidity of proposed action.”113 
Placing burdens on both parties to fulfill certain procedural 
steps prior to the court‟s decision regarding disclosure of grand jury 
minutes provides further safeguards for the strong public policy of 
grand jury secrecy.  It has already been established that the District 
Attorney in Turturro failed to submit the grand jury minutes to the 
trial judge for review prior to disclosing the grand jury minutes at tri-
al.114  Rather than suppressing the grand jury minutes, the proper pro-
cedure would have been to demonstrate the need for disclosure of 
grand jury minutes, which may have been granted by a court order, 
and then to submit those grand jury “to the court immediately prior to 
trial to be kept in the custody of the court.”115  The District Attorney 
in Turturro failed to satisfy each element of the acceptable procedure 
and therefore, failed to satisfy the burden.116  However, the plaintiff 
in Turturro had to show that he would be harmed by the use of grand 
jury minutes and that there was no “legislative intent negating re-
view.”117  The court in Turturro found that “the plaintiff stands to 
suffer injury by the use of the minutes and there is no clear legislative 
negating review, [therefore] this Court finds that he is within the 
„zone of interest‟ and may object.”118  The court rationalized this by 
stating: 
Clearly, fairness and integrity of proceedings was a 
concern for the Court of Appeals when the procedure 
was set down which requires the initial disclosure to 
the trial court and only then to the attorneys upon the 
witness taking the stand.  It is precisely a case such as 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 868. 
114 Turturro, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 814. 
115 Id. at 812. 
116 Id. at 811, 814. 
117 Id. at 811 (“Only where there is a clear legislative intent negating review or a lack of 
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the one before us where the failure to follow the pro-
cedure may cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff.119 
Based on the requirements set forth by Procter & Gamble Co. 
and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., it is likely that had the District Attor-
ney in Turturro presented the grand jury transcripts in his possession 
to the trial court, he would have successfully met the burden of show-
ing a particularized need because he sought to utilize the minutes “to 
impeach a witness.”120  In Procter & Gamble Co., the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of utilizing criminal proceedings to elicit evi-
dence in subsequent civil proceedings.121  The court found that “[i]t is 
only when the criminal procedure is subverted that „good cause‟ for 
wholesale discovery and production of a grand jury transcript would 
be warranted.”122  The purpose for utilizing the grand jury testimony 
in Turturro was to impeach a witness, not to undermine the criminal 
procedure in a subsequent case.123  However, the District Attorney in 
Turturro wholly failed to submit the grand jury transcripts to the trial 
court.  As a result of such a failure, judicial intervention was imposs-
ible.  Although cases such as Procter & Gamble Co. and Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Co. set forth the requirements for the burden the propo-
nent must satisfy, it is crucial to recognize that not only must such a 
burden be met, but such a burden hinges on judicial intervention 
which was completely and erroneously neglected in Turturro. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is important to address the emphasis cases such as Rosario 
put on defendant‟s rights regarding disclosure and the limits placed 
on judicial discretion.124  Typically, the District Attorney is in posses-
sion of grand jury minutes and the issue is whether such minutes 
should be disclosed to the defense.  However, in Turturro, the Dis-
trict Attorney, who represented the defendant, and was in possession 
 
119 Turturro, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 814. 
120 Id. at 811. 
121 Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. at 684. 
122 Id. 
123 Turturro, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 811. 
124 Rosario, 173 N.E.2d at 883. 
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of such grand jury minutes from the previous criminal proceedings.125  
Still, cases such as Dairylea Coop. establish that the plaintiff also has 
rights regarding disclosure if he or she satisfies the zone of interest 
test.126  Additionally, cases such as Procter & Gamble Co. did not 
differentiate between plaintiff and defense, but merely stated that the 
party moving to disclose grand jury minutes has the burden of factual 
demonstration of a particularized need.127  Furthermore, the issue of 
whether or not such procedure is applicable solely to criminal matters 
was decided in Buffalo, which extended disclosure to civil proceed-
ings for the limited uses such as impeaching witnesses.128  The sole 
purpose for the use of grand jury minutes in Turturro was to impeach 
a witness; therefore, the District Attorney could not have even rested 
on the assumption that as a defense counsel in a civil proceeding he 
could disregard the procedure clearly established by precedent. 
The decision in Turturro is crucial for the breadth of intricate 
issues it covers regarding the issue of judicial discretion over disclo-
sure.  The decision in Turturro shows that a variation in details does 
not alter the precedent so consistently established by both federal and 
New York State precedent.  All of the cases cited have a recurring 
theme of the importance of procedure and judicial intervention in the 
disclosure of traditionally secret grand jury minutes.  In a sense, the 
impact of cases such as Turturro is mirrored in the policy set forth by 
Di Napoli—there is the tradition of grand jury secrecy and a need for 
that secrecy to be disclosed at times, the procedure and policy set in 
place seek to find the balance between those competing interests. 
 
Brittany A. Fiorenza  
 
 
125 Turturro, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 811. 
126 Dairylea Coop., 339 N.E.2d at 867. 
127 Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. at 685. 
128 Buffalo, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 922. 
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